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INTRODUCTION
Financial crises occur more frequently than is commonly thought. Although major
pandemic episodes may only number a dozen or two, history is littered with
hundreds of financial crises.1 The US Government’s response to the latest crisis,
for instance, involves the second major US taxpayer bailout in the space of twenty
years, the other resulting from the Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s. By the
same token, previous banking crises do not compare to the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) of 2008, which is in a class of its own (although even the GFC is not
another Great Depression), in terms of both the magnitude of the event itself, and
its subsequent domino effect.
Within the GFC, there are many individual financial crises. The sub-prime
crisis, for instance, is different from others in that for the first time in decades,
probably since the student unrest of the 1960s, there is a simmering sense of angst
in society at large about the socioeconomic system. Although the crisis originated
in the banking sector, its effects spread surprisingly quickly to the entire
economy, giving rise to what has been dubbed the Great Recession. In the US the
jobless rate climbed to over 10 percent. Many lost their homes through
foreclosures, and bank customers everywhere were adversely impacted as credit
lines dried up and macroeconomic conditions deteriorated into recession. Two
years after the crisis, long term unemployment remained at record levels in the
United States, with some 1.4 million out of work for 99 weeks or more, their
unemployment insurance benefits expired. The harmful effects, so evident in
domestic economies, also spilled out internationally, with many reverberations,
including a consequential rise in global poverty: the GFC pushed the ranks of the
world’s hungry to a record high of one billion people, or one in six persons,
according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation.2 A lethal mix
of the global economic slowdown combined with high food prices in many
countries saw the number of people in chronic hunger and poverty top 100
million, according to FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf. Clearly, the adverse
human fallout from the credit crunch in terms of personal and social hardship was
– and continues to be - profound.
The economic disparities flowing from the GFC have earned the public’s
ire, we suggest, not only on account of the economic cost but also because of the
moral chasm that has been exposed, between financiers on the one hand and

1

2

Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial
Crises (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005).
United Nations, “One Sixth of Humanity Undernourished – More than Ever Before,” Media
release (June 19, 2009), http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/20568/icode (accessed July 1,
2009).
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public opinion on the other. A perceived decline in banker scruples, aided in part
by the excessive avarice of some individuals at the expense of others, has caused
some to question faith in the market system and renew talk about economic
‘justice’. For example, the gap between the wages of ordinary workers and the
bonuses paid to those on Wall Street or the City of London, who presided over the
crisis, has provoked strong community reaction3. In response, the community has
found ways to express its disapproval. The spontaneous TEA parties in the United
States are a good example, involving demonstrations by taxpayers aggrieved that
they have been called upon to underwrite the bailout of big banks and who feel
they are Taxed Enough Already, evidence of a groundswell of ill-feeling4.
Community resentment also boiled over in Europe in the aftermath of the
meltdown, in some cases to the point of vandalism of high-paid executives’
property, which has prompted some captains of industry to surrender their golden
handshakes and pension plans.5 Echoing concerns in the community, religious
leaders such as Anglican Archbishop Williams and Pope Benedict XVI have
called for greater attention to what God has to say about economic and social
relationships.6
That the implications of the GFC go beyond economic mechanics, to deep
issues of social cohesion and public belief, is the subject of this essay. We live in
a society, not an economy. Complex societies are built on interdependence and
require trust, a precious communal intangible, yet there is a palpable sense in the
community that the GFC raises serious questions about the fairness of markets,
and that addressing these adequately will be essential to the long-term health of
3

This is not the first time the matter has provoked concern; indeed it has a long history, including
among Catholic social statements. In Casti Connubii, it was detailed that workers should be paid
sufficient wages to support their families, and this ideal was developed in On the Condition of
Workers and Quadragessimo Anno. This may be contrasted to the immense bonuses paid to the
leading executives. See also Mater et Magistra for a thorough treatment of vast disparities in
wealth, and Laborem Exercens (Rome: Vatican, 1981), a treatment by John Paul II on just
wages.
4
If the justice principle in Biblical thought (in the New Testament, see for example James 5:1-5)
is applied with respect to taxes, private wealth should not be exhausted through taxation by the
State, which reduces the ability of a given wage level to support the family.
5
Julia Werdigier, “Bank’s former chief agrees to pension cut,” New York Times (June 19, 2009).
6
Lecture in Cardiff by the Most Rev. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, 2009. Caritas
in Veritate, Papal Encyclical of Benedict XVI (Rome: Vatican, 2009). Note: Archbishops’ tomes
and Papal writings can be viewed as learned commentaries, taking their place among the broader
body of scholarly literature on a given topic. That they are written from a perspective of faith
that seeks to evaluate carefully the normative content of economic analysis and consider the
theological framework of the economic system, need not alter their academic value. For
discussion of Papal encyclicals on the economy see Andrew Yuengert, “The Use of Economics
in Papal Encyclicals,” in Religion and Economics: Normative Social Theory, ed. J. Dean and A.
Waterman (Boston: Kluwer, 1999).
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the socio-economy. Rather than just one or two rotten apples, the GFC seems
different because of the widespread sense that the entire system may be flawed. In
response, a range of commentators including politicians, media and bloggers have
claimed this is ‘the end of capitalism as we know it’.7 If classic socialism died in
1989, perhaps we are now witnessing the demise of classic capitalism since 2009,
to be replaced by Capitalism 2.0, they say. While premature and certainly
overstated, these and similar sentiments telegraph the severity of this historymaking episode. While reverting to a wholesale centralist approach is not
generally favored by most, including prominent religious figures,8 there is
nevertheless a growing sense of a serious disconnect between business and the
common good. These sentiments clearly symbolize the need for business leaders
and policy makers to better understand the influence that collective moral
responsibility can have over aggregate market outcomes.
For economists the GFC presents an analytical challenge to the presumed
efficacy of markets. Every episode of financial chaos raises broader questions
about the functional integrity of markets. In the long run, we are sympathetic to
the view that the effect of markets is to improve morality, because consumers will
eventually penalize firms that engage in unethical behavior.9 Yet in the short run
there are sometimes serious exceptions to this market discipline principle. Under
certain conditions, as evident in the GFC, moral misalignment of markets can and
does occur. In the long run the market may well foster morality, but if the time it
takes for consumers to ‘eventually’ discipline rogue firms is so long that the
collateral damage of the inevitable market correction is of the order seen in the
GFC, then the adjustment lag itself becomes an important issue and cyclical
episodes of moral atrophy cannot easily be swept under the carpet.

7

G. Ruddick, “Capitalism at ‘turning point’ claims Lord Mandelson,” Daily Telegraph London,
(May 14, 2009).
8
Though a range of viewpoints exists among Christians on the issue of capitalism and the role of
government, there is a general consensus that favors private business working for the common
good, over state-dominated centralism. In Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII said socialism was an
illegitimate approach to solving the great social upheaval and heightening tensions of his time.
In Protestant thought, a predominantly private business economy with decisions being made
with a mind to God’s Kingdom is typically preferred. See for instance Jeff Van Duzer and Tim
Dearborn, “The Profit of God,” Christianity Today (2003).
9
Rachel Kotkin, Joshua Hall and Scott Beaulier, “The Virtue of Business: How Markets
Encourage Ethical Behavior.” Journal of Markets and Morality (2010): 45-58. See also Timothy
Lane, “Market Discipline,” IMF Staff Papers (1993): 53-88; and Franco Bruni and Francesco
Paterno, “Market discipline of banks’ riskiness: a study of selected issues.” Journal of Financial
Services Research (2005): 303-325.
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This paper is motivated by questions raised by the global credit crisis about
the human condition and the moral ecology of markets. We first provide an
explanation of the sub-prime crisis in terms of a shared failure of virtue, by
advancing the notion of an endemic moral bubble involving a contagion, and by
placing the GFC experience in theological perspective. The discussion then seeks
to understand why moral atrophy spread virally prior to the GFC blowout: taking
the father of market economics Adam Smith as a starting point, we note that his
idea of social custom crystallized as professional practice provides a useful
window into moral contagions, and that a nexus exists between virtue and market
stability. The paper then asks how we can better immunize the market system
against short run but highly damaging moral epidemics like the GFC. Here we
evaluate Smith’s notion of ‘sympathy’ and the importance of seeing exchanges as
a marketplace of moral goods, not just common goods and services. Accordingly,
the paper emphasizes the vital necessity of maintaining the ethical integrity of
markets, and connects this thought with pro-actively and publically fostering a
sense of commercial virtue, and even spiritual vitality.
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AS SHARED MORAL FAILURE
An interesting question arises when many individuals in a profession or industry
seemingly collaborate in a collective lapse in integrity, as apparently occurred in
the GFC. This phenomenon seems pivotal to explaining the financial Frankenstein
monster that the GFC became.
The dislocation from the financial earthquake to the macroeconomic system
upon which so many depend for their livelihood was of history-making
proportions. Housing markets went into a deep slump, and stock markets dived,
shrinking the life savings and 401(k) pensions of millions. The largest banks in
the United States, United Kingdom and continental Europe found themselves in
serious trouble. Some financial firms in those countries merged or were sold, and
others filed for bankruptcy, starting with the failure of the two largest US
mortgage corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and of Wall Street stalwart
Lehman Brothers. The big four investment banks on Wall Street were shut down
(Lehman), sold off (Merrill Lynch) or turned into bank holding companies
(Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs). During the period of greatest intensity in the
crisis between August and November 2008, central banks supplied emergency
liquidity and national economic authorities arranged injections of taxpayer-funded
capital (‘bail-outs’) for institutions under stress. Assessing the UK bailout
package, the Bank of England said it represented ‘the largest UK government
intervention in financial markets since the outbreak of the First World War’.10
10

Bank of England, Financial Stability Report. (Number 24, October, UK Government: London,
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What really went wrong to cause the Global Financial Crisis? On one level
is the technical explanation. Macroeconomic imbalances were worsening in the
years leading up to 2008, especially between interest rates and asset prices, and
between the US and China. To a significant degree, these imbalances were
exacerbated by poor economic policy decisions. Interest rates were allowed to sit
too low by the Fed and many other central banks, resulting in excessively growth
in mortgages, leading to unsustainable asset price appreciation.11 China’s fixed
renminbi exchange rate policy contributed to the US balance of payments deficit
and saw a massive two trillion dollar build-up in China’s foreign reserves (a fact
eventually acknowledged by China’s landmark decision in May 2010 to finally
allow the previously pegged yuan to begin appreciating against the dollar). This
occurred against a broader background, over a decade or more, following the fall
of the Berlin Wall and Soviet system in 1989, and of the opening up of the Indian
and Chinese economies which saw some two billion consumers enter the world
market on a scale not seen previously.
It is also true that a succession of government structural policies (notably in
the US) in the years leading up to the credit crisis blurred the separation of
commercial banking from social assistance measures. A few examples make the
point. The 1986 Tax Reform Act included the Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduit (REMIC), rules that almost certainly made mortgage securitization more
lucrative, by allowing financial firms to issue multiple-class pass-through
securities without an entity-level tax. The 1995 Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA), seeking to get banks to offer more credit to at-risk small businesses and
low-income earners, while an admirable objective, nevertheless required private
commercial banks to devote a certain proportion of their excess reserves to subprime loans. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed
securities firms to raise their leverage sharply, from the traditionally accepted
ratio of 12-to-1 to a new standard as high as 33-to-1, probably encouraging
imprudent balance sheet growth and greatly increasing the exposure of firms to
minor declines in asset values. The Bush Administration’s 2004 American Dream
package of housing measures that sought to assist low-income groups through
zero equity lending, despite its noble intentions, may have fueled the flow of subprime mortgages that stoked the subsequent lending frenzy and house price
bubble. According to the OECD, the American Dream initiative was a key driver
in the run-up to the crisis, and a core reason why the toxic activities that led to the
meltdown were so much stronger in the US than elsewhere.12
2008): 32.
David Gross, Dumb Money: How our Greatest Financial Minds Bankrupted the Nation (New
York: Free Press, 2009).
12
Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson and Se Hoon Lee, “The current financial crisis: causes
and policy issues.” Financial Market Trends (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

11
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In combination, these and other policy steps no doubt altered the incentives
of US banking firms, toward stimulating the over-production of sub-prime
mortgages and encouraging the growth of a shadow banking system. Without
denying the relevance of economic and legislative causes, we propose that the
well-documented catalog of technical factors alone is insufficient to explain the
GFC. On a deeper level, the crisis needs to also be understood in terms of
collective character. We see this as a two-way street: the application of a decisionmaking framework is an ethically significant act, and equally the adoption of a
moral code is an economic decision. There are two reasons why the moral
dimension of the GFC is worth investigating. From the perspective of economic
stability, such enquiry may prove to be useful in preventing such damaging crises
from being repeated in the future, for the good of all concerned. From a religious,
particularly Christian perspective, the matter of moral integrity looms large for a
different reason: a society that is materially prosperous yet economical with the
truth does not bode well for the human condition. ‘Before you enquire, blame no
man’13, yet to the believer, understanding exceeds riches in importance (Proverbs
16:16). To the religious professional, and a Christian economist in particular,
fresh economic insights may be gleaned from theology: just as a correct and
thorough understand of economics is essential to informed judgment about social
ethics, so too theology may prove to be a boon to informed judgment about
economies.14 On this view, we might seek not only to understand and fix the
problems of the economic crisis, but also to learn from its commentary on the
spiritual condition of mankind. To do so one must therefore seek a holistic
analysis of its causes.
Did an erosion of morality contribute to the crisis? The epicenter of the
crisis was the United States subprime mortgage market, and the seeds of the
debacle lay in the accumulation of junk assets, especially securitized and
residential mortgage-backed loans, that were sub-prime: their liquidity and credit
quality were riskier than usual. Despite their long held consensus about the
prudential superiority of traditional intermediation banking, senior bankers
allowed a shift to a revised version of the originate-and-distribute model in which
securitization became a mantra, particularly in mortgage lending. This meant that
incentives and risk-taking were de-coupled at the coalface and loan volumes
expanded without paying adequate attention to risk. The tried-and-true prime
lending focus of banking increasingly took a back seat to non-conforming housing
Development, 2008).
We are aware of the need for humility and moderation in our enquiry (Matthew 7:1; John 8:7).
Not being fit to cast the first stone, yet we offer this essay in the interests of the common good.
14
Anthony Waterman, “Social Thinking in Established Protestant Churches,” in Religion and
Economics: Normative Social Theory, ed. J. Dean and A. Waterman (Boston: Kluwer. 1999).

13
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loan business, which grew to an unsustainable 12 per cent in the US industry.
Standards of prudent loan assessment were frequently abandoned, for example
through the acceptance of so-called ‘liar’ or low-doc (little or no paperwork) loans
and ‘ninja’ (no income-no job) mortgages, banks perilously liberalized oncerigorous assessments of customers’ capacity-to-pay, evidenced by the
overwhelming number of loan delinquencies post-crisis. Bankers accepted more
no-deposit loans and became more willing to lend up to the full value of a
property, so-called ‘one hundred percent loans’. This imparted an unusually
speculative tone to the business of banking.15
From a faith perspective, this evolution in the business model of banks
provides much food for thought. While we cannot be certain of others’ motives,
bankers may have been induced by less-than-worthy motivations to seek
unsustainable profits. Making just profit from a loan is no sin, and those who take
loans for just reasons with the intent to repay also do no wrong in the Christian
perspective.16 Indeed in many cases bankers may well have acted with good
intentions. Yet the shift in judgment described above put the lending institutions
into an increasingly dangerous position through imprudent loan growth that, like a
sand castle, was in peril of being destroyed by the waves of the oncoming
financial tsunami. One church leader, the Primate of the Church of England,
commented this way: ‘The move away from a realistic focus on scarcity and
productivity/added value and towards the virtualized economy of money
transactions has been deeply seductive, and, over a limited time-frame,
spectacularly successful in generating purchasing power’.17 The Anglican
Archbishop’s argument is that because credit is not something that is naturally
scarce in precisely the same sense that material resources are (a proposition most
economists would dispute), inadequate regulation can foster the illusion that the
money market is effectively risk-free, that ‘money can generate money without
constraint’. The problem comes when massively inflated credit is called in:
‘when the disproportion between actual, measurable material security and what is
15

Pope Benedict XVI, wrote of this in the encyclical Caritas in Veritate (Rome: Vatican, 2009) in
which he decried bad speculative financial decisions.
16
Elaboration is available in Vix Pervenit. Benedict XIV. The GFC was a two-way street: not only
banks, but also their customers may share some of the blame, as there is a Christian obligation to
repay one’s debts. There are two sides to a lending contract from a Christian perspective: while
the lender has a moral obligation not to place an unrealistic burden on the customer, the
borrower has an obligation not to abuse the loan of money that was given and must honor their
promise to repay. Although some customers may not have foreseen the potential downside to
subprime loans despite their best diligence, others may have knowlingly not fulfilled their
obligation and may have lightly taken advantage of easy credit before the GFC, effectively
ended up stealing from their bank. This, in turn, harms others who may justly borrow from the
banks, as it reduces the banks’ ability to loan further funds.
17
Lecture in Cardiff by the Most Rev. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, 2009.
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being claimed and traded on the market is so great that confidence in the
institutions involved collapses’, argues Williams. Because of this loss of
proportion, the Archbishop of Canterbury called for a ‘re-establishment of
patience and trust in economic processes’.18
Clearly, bankers made business mistakes. Yet it also seems at least
plausible that the moral compass of many influential bankers went awry.
Theologically speaking, lenders have a duty of care in the lender-lendee
relationship. While the borrower has an obligation to repay the debt in accordance
with the agreements, the lender has an obligation not just to treat the debtor justly,
but also to work for the common good (Leviticus 19:36, Galatians 5:14). ‘The
current crisis is not caused by sub-prime mortgages, credit default swaps, or failed
economic policies: the root cause is failed leadership’ said Bill George, professor
of management at Harvard Business School. The Archbishop goes further and
openly calls the crisis the fault of an‘underlying sense of greed’.19 Greed is a
recurring villain in both secular and Biblical thought.20 Fifty years before Smith
wrote, the Papal encyclical Vix Pervenit detailed the greed of creditors and
dishonest contracts, and Benedict XIV wrote shortly thereafter of how some
individuals persuade themselves that such actions are legitimate.
Equally, as the broader community reaction by people from all walks of life
demonstrates, one does not need to be religious to take umbrage at the apparent
opportunism evident in the GFC. While some may be unaccustomed to talking
about the notion of a place for higher beliefs in business, many in society’s
mainstream accept there is a universal values dimension to the lending culture that
developed in the period between 2001 and 2007. That loans were made to
customers who could not demonstrate the ability to service the loan sustainably,
and that these effectively necessitated bankers bypassing the accepted standards
of their profession, placing their bank and their clients in jeopardy, is now
established in the public record. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
decided to levy a record-breaking $550 billion fine against market leader
Goldman Sachs in July 2010, to settle federal claims that the investment bank
misled investors in sub-prime mortgages.
On top of the charge of misinformation, many see another layer of guile in
the GFC: opacity. The deterioration in the quality of the loan book was not
adequately revealed to stakeholders until it was far too late. Citigroup, for
example, finally outlined its accounting oversights publically for the first time in
18

Breach of trust brings into play the Biblical command, ‘you shall not commit murder’ which
carries the implication that we should take care of the well-being of our neighbor (Matthew
5:21-26).
19
Lecture at the University of Cambridge by the Archbishop of Canterbury, 2008.
20
Hebrews 13:5, Christians are exhorted to be content with what they have. See also Proverbs
15:27, Luke 12:15.
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July 2010, two years after the crisis. Some might even go so far as to say that the
financial industry concealed the truth from stockholders, bond investors and
regulators alike. The Securities and Exchange Commission has officially taken
this position, fining Citigroup $75 million in July 2010 for lack of disclosure of
subprime risks to bank shareholders, with the S.E.C. enforcement director stating
that ‘the rules of financial disclosure are simple; if you choose to speak, speak in
full and not in half-truths’.21 In moral philosophy, deception does not require
outright lying: silence about material facts or dissembling also amounts to forms
of falsehood, and imply an unfair contract.22 The New York Times drew a parallel
with the junk bond scam of the 1980s: ‘By persuading the markets that the bonds
defaulted at a rate substantially less than the real rate, the sellers of the junk could
demand and receive a higher price for several years. When the real default rate
became known, as it inevitably did, the bonds collapsed in value. The subprime
crisis was essentially the old junk bond scam on super-steroids, with nuclear
weapons thrown in’.23 Credit rating agencies, which operate under a potential
conflict of interest in their relationship to banks, did not sound the alarm. By such
action, they become part of the problem.
Transparency and sound corporate governance are matters of moral
turpitude. In Biblical terms, Proverbs teaches that ‘he that hides his sins does not
prosper’.24 A recent analysis by the OECD pinpoints corporate transparency and
honesty as critical to the strength and safety of financial institutions, finding that
in many instances of systemic instability banks themselves have been at the core
of difficulties, often related to ‘inadequate disclosure and lack of transparency’.25
In the context of the 2008 crisis, this lack of disclosure was telling. One
commentator laments that ‘if Wall Streeters can fudge numbers and get very rich
from that fudging, some may do it’.26 This is a character issue: ‘fudging numbers’
amounts to a form of cheating, and legitimizes a culture in which individuals and
firms feel less obligation to honor business agreements, to do unjust damage to
others, or having caused harm to repair the damage as much as they can. This
becomes a market in which signals are mixed and incentives are distorted. When
the incentives are flawed, an environment is established in which violations of the
21

New York Times (July 30, 2010).
In Vix Pervenit, Benedict XIV wrote in 1745 against dishonest profits and immoral contracts,
where a fair contract is one generally considered acceptable and compatible with Christian
ethics.
23
Ben Stein, “Dad’s Reminders Never Grow Old.” New York Times (June 21, 2009).
24
Proverbs 28:13
25
Stephen Lumpkin, “Resolutions of Weak Institutions: Lessons Learned from Previous Crises,”
Financial Market Trends (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
2008).
26
Ben Stein, op cit.
22
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common good become easy and, more insidious, easy to rationalize.27 This
exemplifies how markets and morality interact.
It is difficult to avoid the impression that an extraordinary and collegial
deterioration in moral governance in the banking sector played a key part in the
crisis, by allowing a flexibility in business values to develop unchecked.28 The
verdict of Gillian Tett in her book Fool’s Gold is that the US$2 trillion losses
from the crisis were self-inflicted, and unlike many banking crises, ‘not triggered
by war, a widespread recession, or any external shock’, but rather ‘the entire
financial system went wrong as a result of flawed incentives within banks and
investment funds, as well as the ratings agencies’.29 It was, in other words, a
matter of market culture.
Significantly, the path to moral atrophy in the credit crisis was within legal
bounds, and, generally speaking, was not illegal. The GFC lay within the zone of
moral ambiguity. Avoidance of moral responsibility was the problem, not outright
criminal evasion. This gray area has been nicknamed ‘avoision’. We are not
dealing here with the Enrons or Worldcoms of this world, where the actions in
question were illicit, legally speaking, and where the fallout was mostly restricted
to those directly connected with the individual firm concerned. By contrast, unlike
the junk bonds scandals of the 1980s, there have been no courtroom prosecutions
arising directly from the GFC. The atrophy of character in the latest episode was
not ostensibly criminal. This makes it harder to address. Rather than outright
fraud, the GFC has to do with a losing sight of the common good, with
unprincipled conduct that is nevertheless legal. Yet faiths such as Christianity
teach that life is not about expediency. From a theological perspective, unethical
choices hiding behind the veil of legality are nonetheless unethical, and equally
capable of leading to problems such as those witnessed in the GFC. Legality
allows rationalization, and rationalization allows unethical customs to flourish.
Critical to understanding all this is the fraternal dimension. This is what
makes the GFC such a powerful challenge to the long run assumption that the
market will discipline unethical behavior. Greed has been around for thousands of
27

The OT commandment against stealing (Exodus 20) has the implication that, in business, all
participants behave with respect toward others for the benefit of the common good. Flawed
incentives make this outcome difficult to achieve. See also Leviticus 19:35-36 and Proverbs
16:8.
28
The ‘flexibility’ displayed by bankers is consistent with recent research on executive behavior
patterns by Finkelstein and others suggesting that business leaders make fatal mistakes because
personal will competes with rationality. All of us operate according to self-interest, which
imparts bias and creates blind spots. We are not always aware that our sub-conscious is often
driving our decision-making. The Bible says there is a deadly self-centeredness in us all (2
Timothy 3:2-4).
29
Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at JP Morgan was Corrupted
by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe (New York: Free Press, 2009).
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years, and has caused many individuals and firms to stumble, but usually as
isolated cases and in an uncoordinated fashion. Yet apparently the particular yeast
that caused the GFC cake to rise was the industry-wide and cohort-condoned
nature of the problem. Amidst the overheated economic environment in the years
immediately preceding the GFC, it appears that the industry collectively reached –
or was striving for - a kind of Wall Street alchemy, an attempt to manufacture
banking gold out of lesser metals. By means of some dubious financial
metallurgy, the greater part of the profession gained or sought too much too
quickly and lost all sense of proportion, exceeding a critical threshold of
excessive seeking success-at-any-cost. There was a collegial effect at work: when
a critical mass of people forms a wave of excessive avarice, there exists the
potential for an epidemic.30 Society can be said to have reached its threshold of
excessive ‘affluenza’ when, for whatever reason, the associated avarice stimulates
changes in behavior en masse, away from norms of decency and the greater good.
The follow-on result from this obsessive private devotion to affluence can be a
decline in corporate character, especially in matters of character.31 If there are
many such individuals across an industry or an economy, if society as a whole
turns away from common principle in its business dealings, then the
macroeconomic results can be devastating, as illustrated by the GFC.32 Such loss
of faith is not usually sudden. It is more typically a gradual process that is
encouraged by peer group moral migration toward expediency. Competitive
pressure, usually such a positive force in the economic production process, can
become a negative factor in this environment, when it provokes players to
increasingly outdo each other in cutting moral corners to win the next deal. One
piece of rationalization leads to another, and as virtue atrophies away, there is less
of a safeguard preventing further rationalization of wrong practices. It is not
surprising that the change towards irresponsible lending was a glacial process that
began back in the 1990s (or earlier), before eventually coming to a head in 2008.
In summary, it seems certain that the Global Financial Crisis can be
attributed, at least in part, not simply to technical factors but also to the human
condition, and that the dereliction of duty underlying the GFC systematically
ballooned beyond a few isolated cases to become an epidemic. The episode can be
30

Note that it is not mammon per se that is responsible: money itself is not evil, rather the New
Testament tells us the love of money is the root of all kinds of evil. Instead, money is simply a
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thought of as a moral bubble, akin to an asset price bubble where the quantities
involved are moral rather than monetary. The GFC reminds us that markets, in
general, have both a hard infrastructure (goods, services, price signals) and a soft
infrastructure consisting in their moral fabric (trust, prudence, transparency).
Though less quantifiable in its dimensions, the latter is equally important to the
long-term sustainability of any given market. In terms of economic theory, the
GFC was a cyclical episode in which the soft infrastructure of markets – usually
kept robust by the threat of market discipline on bad behavior – broke down for a
significant period. From a spiritual perspective, the GFC again raises age-old
moral-philosophical questions about human nature, and what kind of society we
are becoming.
Two questions, in particular, are of interest. By what process or force does
moral atrophy tend to spread in markets? And - given that we live in a pluralist
society – how can our secular market system be encouraged to retain the norms
needed to guide and constrain economic conduct, for the common good?
HOW MORAL ATROPHY SPREADS: ADAM SMITH’S THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
With capitalism under intense pressure, it is appropriate to re-visit the views of
Adam Smith, the pioneer economist and moral philosopher who is regarded
(rightly or wrongly) as the father of modern market economics. In addition to
launching the classical engineering view of markets with The Wealth of Nations
published in 1776, Smith also had much to say on the role of morality in the
economy, notably in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indeed, the ethical
shortcomings highlighted by the GFC may have come as no surprise to him. In
this section we will show that Smith certainly appreciated the importance of the
connection between markets and morality, an observation attested by the fact that
he kept working on the Theory, first published in 1759, right up until his death in
1790, revising the work some six times. By the same token, the Theory was
written before Wealth and supplied the ethical, philosophical, psychological
foundations for the later, better-known work.
This nuanced and integrated view of Smith, regrettably, has not always
been fully appreciated. Over time, arguably, advocates of the free market have
tended to lose sight of the philosophical side of Smith’s work. Some have
concluded that the Theory, with its emphasis on altruism, contradicts Smith’s
other work on markets and impartial exchange that seems to preach self-interest,
(a view known as the ‘Adam Smith problem’). In his famous pin factory
illustration in Wealth Smith seems to argue that the public interest is best served
by each person pursuing his own private gain, whereas in the Theory he suggests
that instead of simply pursuing expediency, economic players need also to display
congruity with their fellow man. It is fair to say that the predominant discourse
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about Adam Smith in the twentieth century favored the first over the second: it
was very much a product of the prevalence of neoclassical economics, and tended
to paint an overly amoral and individualistic picture of markets. ‘Modern
economists tend to build a Smith in their own image by quoting very selectively
from the relatively infrequent but hugely influential passages in the Wealth of
Nations’.33
This reduction of Smith’s thought has been incomplete, and misleading. As
a polymath and professor of moral philosophy, Adam Smith understood there are
diverse sets of values affecting economic actors besides mere price, including
psychological motivation such as greed, sociological factors such as religion,
emotional loyalty to a firm, and so on. Though it is more evident in the Theory
than in the Wealth of Nations, looking into human nature was highly relevant to
Smith and if we restrict ourselves to an overly mechanistic-individualistic reading
of his more famous tome, we risk missing the socio-behavioral aspects of his
message. A model of a mechanical market mechanism is one thing, but the reality
of human actions is another matter entirely, and Smith was not naïve about this
fact.
In particular, the Theory and Wealth need not necessarily be seen as
contradictory. Smith’s self interest is the notion of enlightened self-interest, that
each person’s best interests are bound up with those of his customers, workers,
and so on.34 By exercising solidarity with trading partners, the Smithian
individual will indirectly enhance his own prospects. Smith’s suggestion is that as
economic players engage in an examination of conscience, asking if they have
done their duties as citizens by promoting justice and safeguarding the welfare of
the community at large, then paradoxically - more often than not – this will be
good for business. In keeping with this, contemporary scholarly literature is
increasingly revising the more jaundiced dualistic view of Smith.35 Recent
interpreters, noting the apparent disagreement between that monochrome view of
human nature in Wealth of Nations and the more complex, multi-layered
understanding in Theory, have pointed to various principles as a way of
reconciling the two. For instance, Otteson develops the notion of familiarity,
which refers to the social distance between two people, how well they know each
33
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This ironic conception of self-interest was Smith’s great insight. Although traces of the
enlightened view arguably can be found prior to Smith, he crystallized it most effectively. Pierre
Force, Self-interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
35
Examples are Sam Fleischacker, On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical
Companion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), or Leonides Montes, Adam Smith in
Context: A Critical Reassessment of some Central Components of his Thought (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
34

12
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2009

13

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 1 [2009], Art. 4

other.36 He argues that while familiarity is only implicit in Wealth, it was central
in the Theory, and clearly important to Smith in both works because it acts as a
unifying thread. In order for markets to function well, Smith believed that the
individual best improved their own condition by looking to that of others. This is
why principled conduct is desirable in the Smithian marketplace of morals.
An important section in the Theory in this respect is Part V: ‘On the
Influence of Custom and Fashion Upon the Moral Sentiments of Mortal
Approbation and Disapprobation’.37 Smith begins by saying there are ‘other
principles’ (besides sympathy) which have a considerable influence on the moral
sentiments of mankind (Part V, Chapter I). These principles are ‘custom and
fashion’. He develops an argument based on how the human mind tends toward
association. Speaking of how we judge beauty, Smith writes that ‘when two
objects have frequently been seen together, the imagination acquires a habit of
passing easily from the one to the other’. If the first appears, we lay mental odds
that the second will follow. And we do this despite the fact that ‘independent of
custom, there should be no real beauty in their union’, yet when custom has so
connected them together, we feel ‘an impropriety in their separation’. In turn this
can alter our standards: ‘those who have been accustomed to slovenly disorder
lose all sense of neatness or elegance’. Over time, this human propensity has the
consequence of generating instability in our moral sentiments, because social
custom and fashion are continually evolving. This may not be a message we find
easy to accept. ‘Few men’, writes the philosopher, ‘are willing to allow that
custom or fashion have much influence on their judgments’, yet a moment’s
reflection ‘may convince them of the contrary’.
Having proposed the idea in respect of our sentiments towards beauty,
Smith then takes this peer culture axiom - which is very much like the modernday behavioral heuristic38 of representativeness - and applies it to our moral
judgments, in Chapter II of Part V. By way of illustration, he notes that in the
reign of Charles II a degree of licentiousness was ‘connected, according to the
notions of those times, with generosity, sincerity, magnanimity, loyalty, and
36
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proved that a person who acted in this manner was a gentleman and not a puritan’
while ‘severity of manners and regularity of conduct, on the other hand, were
altogether unfashionable, and were connected in the imagination of the age, with
cant, cunning, hypocrisy and low manners’. Likewise, the degree of frugality,
which in a Polish nobleman would be considered as excessive parsimony, would
be regarded as extravagance in a citizen of Amsterdam. In particular, argues
Smith, this tendency toward jumping on the bandwagon applies notably within a
given trade or market circle: ‘the objects in which men in the different professions
and states of life are conversant being very different, and habituating them to very
different passions, naturally form in them very different characters and manners’.
In theory, the propriety of a person’s actions should be independent of any one
circumstance of his situation, and should instead be justified by appeal to timeless
principles, whatever the situation. But the ‘peculiar character and manners which
we are led by custom to appropriate to each rank and profession’ and ‘the
different situations of different ages’ are apt to ‘give different characters to the
generality of those who live in them’.
This supplies helpful insight into how moral atrophy can spread within
markets. Immoral sentiments, what Smith terms ‘habits of falsehood and
dissimulation’ (and theologians call sin), can tend to be contagious within a
certain industry or among a given group of artisans, as shared sentiments about
virtue (and vice) ‘naturally become habitual to them’. The moral ecology of
financial markets, in other words, is highly social.39 Smith seems fully aware we
are social beings, and accordingly we are apt to adopt norms that are influenced
by contemporary mores, the crowd, accepted language, common representation,
and so on. Human ethical misconduct and collective expediency – not in the ideal
but in observed practice - will therefore often exhibit a viral nature.
From our discussion of the GFC, the evidence suggests that bankers almost
certainly experienced moral contagion, telling themselves that ‘everybody is
doing it’ (making unwarranted sub-prime loans). Chuck Prince, CEO of Citibank,
has been quoted as saying that ‘when the music is playing, you need to keep
dancing’, suggesting that on Wall Street peer pressure is a powerful driver,
imparting a bandwagon bias to moral judgments such that they become heavily
influenced by a reference group. We suggest in the build-up years to the GFC, the
creeping presence of an influential reference group of unethical managers began
to infect the rest of the market, starting a moral contagion. This is consistent with
work by economists Noe and Rebello who model the agency relationship between
managers and investors and argue that while some ethical managers develop
internalized norms through socialization that prevent them from acting
39
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opportunistically, other unethical managers lack these norms.40 The authors find
that boom conditions magnify the effect: the higher the economic activity
increases, the greater are opportunities to profit from unethical behavior,
increasing the influence of the unethical managers and eroding ethical standards
over the long run. This is also consistent with the work of Basu who shows that
while the ‘right to give up rights’ (which is akin to Smith’s notion of sympathy) is
an important ingredient in the economic welfare of the individual, an agent’s
decision to waive their rights depends on how others waive their rights. That is,
the behavior of the one player affects another.41
We pause to summarize the argument so far. From Smith we learn that
markets always and everywhere act as trading exchanges in not one but two
commodities simultaneously – money and morals. From our analysis of the GFC
debacle, we observe that the first can drive out the second. Individual participants,
faced with commercial pressures (which are urgent and visible), feel a temptation
to cut corners on ethics (which appear to be less urgent and less tangible, and thus
less costly). The sacrifice ratio between the two, based on relative consequences,
can seem to favor monetary considerations over moral, at least in the short term.
This is especially significant under conditions where peer customs begins to
create a viral ‘permission’ effect within a given market toward relaxing standards:
this has the effect of altering the relative cost ratio for the individual by placing a
lower premium on virtue considerations and a higher premium on the need to
succeed. Yet Smith’s point – that there is an interconnectedness in any given
market between its monetary trading and its moral quality – means that any
regress toward moral atrophy will eventually have negative consequences for
economic trade itself, inevitably leading to atrophy not only of ethical standards
but of the monetary efficacy of the market as a whole. Market forces, in this
instance, crowded out morals. The GFC vividly demonstrates the effect, and
shows that the true calculus for the ultimate good of the market system is jointly
monetary and moral.
That moral contagion – both positive and negative - looms large in the
operation of markets, yet arguably remains under appreciated by modern
economists, is an idea that has been hinted at from time to time by some
prominent economists during the past half century. Hayek, for instance, spoke of
a ‘fatal conceit’ that afflicts human beings and observed that ‘one should never
suppose that our reason is in the higher critical position and that only those moral
rules are valid that reason endorses’.42 Though the actors in the market tend to
40
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dislike these norms of character and may fail to understand their validity, agents
unintentionally conform to certain traditional practices and patterns of virtue,
Hayek argued, as a matter of expediency. He concluded that these norms spread
‘fairly rapidly’. Nobel prize winner Vernon Smith, one of the pioneers of the
application of market theory to the field of behavioural economics, voices similar
sentiments in his Cato Journal paper reflecting on fifty years as a student of
human behavior.43 He argues that markets are essentially the product of
underlying moral norms, without which they could not exist.
MINIMIZING CYCLICAL DEVIATIONS IN THE VIRTUE OF MARKETS
Moral atrophy across a market has tangible economic costs. Noe and Rebello
demonstrate in theory – and the GFC shows it empirically – that higher ethical
standards on the part of managers increase economic activity, and vice versa. Any
tendency of markets toward viral moral atrophy therefore presents society as a
whole with a significant problem: if markets, for all their proven efficiency at
producing goods, contain within themselves an ability to fall into ethical atrophy
from time to time, in turn threatening their very efficiency, then how can the
system be better immunized to prevent this?
Smith’s remedy in the Theory is couched in terms of a system in which a
principled ‘sympathy’ with one’s fellows plays a pivotal role. Smith proposes the
role of mutual sympathy because he must solve the apparent tension between a
cohesive society and the self-interested pursuit of commerce. Smith observed in
his famous economic treatise that ‘the private interests and prejudices of
particular orders of men’ have expressed themselves without calculating the
consequences of their actions ‘upon the general welfare of society’. Smith’s
solution to this dilemma is to put forward a scheme whereby the pursuit of private
interest is coupled with the cultivation of public spirit, which he terms
benevolence. He emphasized the role of mutual sympathy and moral conscience
in creating a stable polity, such that in his overall vision, moral-philosophical
pillars and socialized sentiments underpin the economic judgments that help lead
to a cohesive society under a market regime.
This idea, that mutual public sympathy is an essential adjunct to private
competitive markets, gained added force for the architect of market-based
economics with Smith’s sixth edition of his Theory. His revisions in 1790
heighten the contrast between mere beneficence and true justice (note especially
Part II, Section II, Chapter I). The first is ornamental only, while the second is
fundamental. Beneficence is a weaker form of sympathy that consists in voluntary
43
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benevolence and which the lack of ‘is no positive evil’. The mere want of
beneficence, says Smith, ‘seems to merit no punishment from equals’. Justice, by
contrast, is mandatory and a much stronger duty, the violation of which is injury.
Smith observes that ‘somehow or other, we feel ourselves to be in a peculiar
manner tied, bound and obliged to the observation of justice’. By this second form
of moral duty, Smith is then moved to declare that ‘there can be no proper motive
for hurting our neighbour’ (Chapter II) and ‘though it may be true, therefore, that
every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers himself to all mankind, yet
he dares not look mankind in the face and avow that he acts according to this
principle’.
Here Smith’s Theory offers an important insight into dealing with the GFC
and its aftermath, by helping us understand how to combat moral atrophy in a
secular society and its tendency to become epidemic. In the subprime crisis, if the
economic actors who made those unethical choices because of vice contagion
could have appreciated that the very market upon which they depend for their
own livelihood is not only a place where goods are traded but also a framework of
mutual trust, and that the two are intertwined for the greater good, then they may
have employed a different type of calculus. Values such as human dignity,
solidarity and fair play would have had a better chance of retaining a real role in
decision-making, and themselves been part of a positive viral outworking. (The
viral effect can operate for good as well as ill.) Based on Smith’s notion of moral
sympathy, the market might have been more likely to agree on norms to restrain
and guide the economic system through the difficult ethical choices faced in the
years 2001-2006, when the seeds of the crisis were sown. To the extent that such
civic sentiment gained credence in the public sphere, it would have been selfenforcing, because in each profession the prevailing ethical sentiments (in Smith’s
words) ‘become habitual to them’.
For instance, the collective attitude of bankers toward risk and toward
balance sheet prudence is a case in point. A post-crisis official report from the
OECD concludes that faced with competitive pressures, ‘the corporate
governance and risk control functions in many firms will adjust to accommodate
strategy’.44 In effect, to maintain market share and return short-term profits to
shareholders, bankers stepped up their off-balance sheet mortgage securitization
to reckless levels in order to maximize revenue streams. The result was a marked
acceleration in subprime leverage over time, beyond the normal limits of prudent
balance sheet management. An alternative scenario might have gone as follows:
prudently anticipating that commercial financial organizations are sustainable
only when they are constrained by prudential limits, and acknowledging that there
44

Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson and Se Hoon Lee, “The current financial crisis: causes
and policy issues.” Financial Market Trends (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 2008).

17
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jrbe/vol1/iss2/4

18

Hawtrey and Johnson: On the Atrophy of Moral Reasoning

is a difference between reasonable risk-taking and gambling, and despite the fact
that ramping up sub-prime loans would increase profits in the short term,
management might have anticipated there would likely be a heavy price to pay in
the long term. In order to avoid the large write-downs that such a strategy would
inevitably lead to, bankers as a profession might have thus exercised their duty of
care and agreed to maintain certain limits on junk lending, for the good of the
industry. This, despite the personal cost to them in the short term of reduced
bonuses or profit reports.
From a purely mercenary point-of-view, this may not sound persuasive.
Yet Smith’s theory suggests that in fact it pays to be nice, and research has shown
that mutual cooperation is better for both parties than mutual defection.45 This is
because any short run gains from selfish choices will be outweighed by long run
costs. That said, perhaps some may still wish to object that the above
counterfactual scenario is unrealistic, on the grounds that commercial pressure
leaves individual bankers with little choice but to jump on the bandwagon. In
reply, we note that customers regard a working moral compass is an essential part
of this thing economists call ‘the market’, and therefore reputation needs to be
factored in as an intangible business asset, one that should not be jettisoned, even
under duress. This intangible asset was undervalued by bankers involved in the
GFC. In the years prior to the crisis, the OECD argues that the US business model
for bankers moved too far toward an ‘equity culture’ with a focus on faster share
price growth and earnings expansion.46 The previous ‘credit model’ of banking,
based on balance sheets and old-fashioned spreads on loans, was not conducive to
banks becoming growth stocks. So, the strategy switched more toward fees via
securitization, which enabled bankers to grow their earnings while at the same
time economizing on capital under the Basel system. The consequence was a
significant crash in the value of the firms concerned. The reason? Corporate
character is a form of ‘social capital’ that has a dollar market value. Ironically,
Catholic social thought predicts this: it has generally been suspicious of purely
materialistic theories in business.47 Likewise evangelicals urge listeners to regard
the pursuit of money as secondary to seeking first the kingdom and the eternal
salvation that Jesus came to accomplish.48
Were bankers aware of the direction in which they were drifting? It is now
45
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a documented fact that Goldman Sachs (and others) created certain securities,
packaged and sold them to clients, and then bet against those very same securities,
cynically predicting their clients would lose money on the products Goldman had
sold to them. In other words, it was a conscious choice. Despite the competitive
and policy forces bearing down upon them, lenders arguably had a choice how to
respond49. They did not need to bet against their own clients. They did not need to
over-react to the housing market imbalances and the stimulatory policies of
government in a manner that had the effect of making matters worse. Rather than
allowing traditional distinctions between different financial activities (banking,
securities dealing, asset management etc) to become even more blurred financial
firms could have maintained time-honored firewalls of their profession. The
conventional approach, after all, has served well as a business strategy for many
decades.
Where were the captains of industry in all this? The role of CEOs and of
others in prominent positions raises the question of opinion leadership if markets
are to be continually renewed. To the extent that market players base their
customs partly on that of their peers, as Smith proposed, then leaders play an
important role in setting the tone and direction. The ‘social proof’ heuristic (in the
terminology of modern behavioral theory) is a phenomenon that occurs in
ambiguous situations when people are unable to determine the appropriate mode
of behavior: making the assumption that surrounding people possess more
knowledge about the situation, players may deem the moral behavior of others as
a guide, by assuming it is better informed. What one does affects the other, and a
moral-laden choice by one member of an industry or profession can have a
negative effect on the ethical position of another member, creating a domino
effect.
These observations argue the need for market leaders to fully appreciate the
influence that collective moral tone can have over aggregate market outcomes.
When those in authority abdicate their responsibility for values leadership, then
the ethical chasm that has been opened may continue to widen to increasingly
dangerous levels.50 Hawtrey and Dullard argue that those in positions of influence
in business have an obligation to care for the codified integrity of their industry
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and to promote corporate virtue, which takes a certain amount of valor.51 It takes
courage to lean against the wind when everyone else is bending with it. As
General George S. Patton, Jr. was known to say, “moral courage is the most
valuable and usually the most absent characteristic in men”.52 A comprehensive
understanding of leadership by key opinion-makers within and outside the
industry (which can and should include not just bankers but also journalists,
clergy, professors and the like) requires decision-shapers to proactively shape the
values and culture of markets, not just the technical coefficients of production and
exchange. This involves developing an agreed-upon language of moral
sentiments, a shared public narrative, and a cohesive community vision of
corporate character. The GFC has shown that all economics is faith-based, and
vividly highlighted the importance of restoring public trust in the system, a
leadership task that is ultimately about truth, beliefs, virtues, and norms.
Here again, Smith is helpful. He argues that ‘a superior may, indeed,
sometimes, with universal approbation, oblige those under his jurisdiction to
behave … with a certain degree of propriety to one another’. That is, the civil
authorities have an important role to play in safeguarding the moral fabric of
markets:
The civil magistrate is entrusted with the power not only of preserving the
public peace by restraining injustice, but of promoting the prosperity of the
commonwealth, by establishing good discipline, and by discouraging every sort
of vice and impropriety; he may prescribe rules, therefore, which not only
prohibit mutual injuries among fellow citizens, but command mutual good
offices to a certain degree.

Applied to banking in the wake of the GFC, market leaders – and legislators should have played a more constructive role in setting moral norms, by
proactively helping to answer the values questions periodically thrown up by the
market. What might so-called ‘high-standard’ market trading look like? Should
the bonus and incentive culture on Wall Street be immune from community
opinion (and what does the theory of the just wage have to teach us about CEO
salaries53)? Credit derivatives are complex instruments involving risk: should they
be subject to standardized trading that enhances transparency to the community?
Is it beneficial in the long run for banks to be allowed to grow ‘too big to fail’
(and is it desirable for governments to be running banks)? In an industry driven by
51
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debt, where are the prudent limits to borrowing?
Commercial leadership involves a certain amount of moral wisdom.54
Positive consensus-building prior to the GFC would almost certainly have made a
measurable difference to the outcome. There is evidence that peer pressure from
inside the industry, as well as from outside voices (such as poets and preachers)
works. To illustrate, consider the outbreak of transparency that has followed in the
wake of the post-crisis G20 Summit in London in February 2009. Of an OECD
blacklist of countries that have yet to implement internationally accepted
standards of transparency on tax disclosure, a number agreed in the wake of the
G20 meeting to relax banking secrecy laws, including Andorra, Monaco,
Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, Malaysia, Philippines and Uruguay.
Legislators, for their part, can no doubt also influence the moral tone of
markets. A recent case study will serve to illustrate, from Japan. In June 2009,
Japanese regulators imposed sanctions on Citibank (suspension of advertising for
one month) for failing to monitor suspicious transactions. The Financial Services
Authority in that country highlighted fundamental problems with Citgroup’s
compliance and monitoring system, and noted that it had failed ‘to make
notification of suspicious transactions, including money laundering’. Citigroup
issued an apology, and said it would comply with the regulator’s order and would
submit a revised business plan. Whatever economic structure is chosen by
regulators, it should be for the well being of the population, as such structures are
intended to be instruments not of oppression, but of human freedom.55 The state
has a duty to protect the rights of all people, and especially its weakest
members.56
CONCLUSION
We have advanced the proposition that the Global Financial Crisis reflects a
moral bubble. Decision-making by market actors was influenced by “the crowd”
in the years building up to the GFC, generating a tendency toward viral moral
atrophy. Insight into this capacity for ethical toxicity in markets was sought by revisiting Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Given that Smith is
considered the father of market economics, it is important to return to his writings
for a reappraisal. We argue that Smith’s system of mutual sympathy provides a
helpful corrective by reminding us of the role that moral infrastructure plays in
54
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the operation of markets. The two elements – markets and morality – must be held
in dynamic tension together, but this principle was lost sight of in the GFC. The
episode provides an important case study of how markets interact with morality,
and supports a hypothesis that the operational functionality of markets - a
necessary condition for the efficiency and equilibrium propositions of classical
economics to be fully realized – can fail in the presence of imperfect integrity.
On the positive side, we see the GFC as a historical aberration. In the long
run, markets probably tend to improve morality, because consumers will
eventually impose sanctions firms that engage in poor conduct. Yet as we have
argued in this paper, there are sometimes serious departures in the short run.
These stem from market imperfections due to human nature, overlayed with viral
group dynamics. It is tempting to dismiss the problem of episodic moral atrophy
with a wave of the hand and belief that eventually, ‘the market will correct it’. Yet
as the GFC shows, the risks of such an approach are not trivial: millions of people
have paid a huge cost. On this occasion, the market took so long to detect and
correct the imperfect behavior by firms that the economic casualties were
immense. It is now exceedingly apparent that the willingness of stakeholders prior
to the crisis to place an almost blind faith in the idea that a deregulated financial
sector would regulate itself,57 proved to be extremely costly. This cost itself
constitutes a moral issue that cannot be ignored or downplayed. One thing is
clear: if we look at the great credit meltdown only on a technical level, we will be
hit by another crisis again one day. We need to see markets in terms of moral
technology, not trading technology alone.
The GFC was distinctive not only because of the gigantic economic loss, but
also because it set the business community on a collision course with the broader
values of the community. The crisis ignited a debate over the common vision for
society. When ‘the market’ is used to justify a sequence of events that - in
hindsight - includes widespread behavior that most people agree is wrong, we
have moved into the moral dimension of economics. We are not suggesting that
morality can be legislated, although there is a role for legal sanctions. While there
is now recognition, in the wake of the GFC, that the legal infrastructure of the
market needs an overhaul - Washington made a significant statement to this effect
by enacting the most far-reaching Financial Reform Bill in history, adopted by
Congress in July 2010 - by the same token it remains clear to us that the issue is
not legality per se. Nor do we believe that the answer is to teach ethics more in
business schools, although there is a place for that too. In 1987 Harvard
University received a gift of $30 million and set out to use it to teach students that
‘ethics pays’. Yet two decades later, the ethical debacle of the GFC suggests that
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the impact felt from such programs may have fallen short of expectations.
The GFC is about more than law, and goes deeper than mere ethics. It
involves belief. This essay has sought to demonstrate that the challenge of moral
atrophy in markets is tied to the spiritual condition of the society in which markets
are nested.58 When the community is unsure of its religious faith, then the moral
path can easily become a slippery slope. In response, the Christian faith calls us to
believe in One greater than ourselves and the Scriptures remind us ‘what profit a
man to gain the whole world, only to lose his soul?’.59 There is, in other words, a
belief dimension to economic cycles that is bound up with the human condition:
amidst the pressures of commercial survival it is easy to lose sight of what we are
living for, and wake up one day to find the knowledge of God has been crowded
out, with harmful results.
Ultimately it is not markets that atrophy morally, it is people. We believe
that the issue of market integrity failure requires a reaffirmation of faith, which
means hearing the Gospel afresh. Belief in a higher purpose is needed to bring
about a true reformation of persons, who will in turn become agents for the kind
of market character that will engender an economics for the common good.
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